OBJECTIVE: We studied and compared the attitudes of pregnant women v new mothers in an attempt to confirm changing patterns of maternal response towards medical ethical decision making in critically ill or malformed neonates. DESIGN: Data were obtained by questionnaires divided into three sections: 1. sociodemographic; 2. Theoretical principles which might be utilised in the decision-making process; 3. Hypothetical case scenarios, each followed by possible treatment options. RESULTS: Pregnant women (n = 545) consistently requested less aggressive medical intervention for the (...) hypothetical cases than did new mothers (n = 250) [Trisomy 18: 57% v 42%; p = 0.0004; Asphyxia: 75% v 63%; p = 0.0017; Down's syndrome 81% v 62%; p = 0.0001; LBW 85% v 75%; p = 0.004]. Significant differences were also observed in the responses to the theoretical principles, with pregnant women attributing less importance to preserving life at all cost, while being more concerned with physical and emotional pain and suffering, with financial cost, and with the infant's potential for future productivity. (shrink)

The 2015 Paris Agreement set a global warming limit of 2°C above preindustrial levels. Corporations play an important role in achieving this objective, and methods have recently been developed to map global climate targets to specific industries, and individual corporations within those industries. In this article, we assess whether Sustainability ratings capture corporate performance in meeting the 2°C target. We analyze nine rating schemes used by investors and three commonly used in academic studies. Most rating schemes do consider corporate greenhouse (...) gas emissions in their analysis, whereas only a minority scale emissions by factors that have the potential to allow benchmarking against science-based targets. None take the final step of mapping climate indicators against the 2°C target. Furthermore, we find a lack of consistency in the climate change ratings of the databases used in academic studies. These results are concerning in the context of being able to meet global climate change goals. (shrink)

The use of and roughly ‘to be as naught’, and of the comparable phrases employing nominally, is well known, especially in tragedy, and has been frequently commented upon. None the less I think there is still some misapprehension about the nature of the use, seen in its most acute form where and μη- occur in conjunction. We may think of Soph. Aj. 1231 on which much ink has been spilt.

Despite mounting evidence that abusive supervision triggers interpersonal aggression, much remains unknown regarding the underlying causal mechanisms within this relationship. We explore the role of turnover intentions as a mediator in the relationship between abusive supervision and subsequent supervisor-rated interpersonal aggression. We use a sample of 324 supervisor–subordinate dyads from nine organizations and find support for this mediation effect. Furthermore, we find that power-distance orientation and perceived human resource support climate, as important boundary conditions, independently interact with abusive supervision to (...) weaken this positive impact on turnover intentions, thereby reducing interpersonal aggression. We also find via turnover intentions that abusive supervision intensifies interpersonal aggression among high power-distance-oriented individuals when the HR support climate is perceived to be low. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

Placebo-controlled trials are controversial when individuals might be denied existing beneficial medical interventions. In the case of malaria, most patients die in rural villages without healthcare facilities. An artesunate suppository that can be given by minimally skilled persons might be of value when patients suddenly become too ill for oral treatment but are several hours from a facility that can give injectable treatment for severe disease. In such situations, by default, no treatment is (or can be) given until the patient (...) reaches a facility, making the placebo control design clinically relevant; alternative bioequivalence designs at the facility would misrepresent reality and risk incorrect conclusions. We describe the ethical issues underpinning a placebo-controlled trial in severe malaria. To protect patients and minimise risk, all patients were referred immediately to hospital so that each had a higher chance of prompt treatment through participation. There was no difference between artesunate and placebo in patients who reached clinic rapidly; among those who could not, a single artesunate suppository significantly reduced death or permanent disability, a finding of direct and indirect benefit to patients in participating villages and elsewhere. (shrink)

The author of this little book makes no claim to being a philosopher, and is fully conscious of the very obvious limits of his writing ability. He is fully aware, too, of the nebulousness of his task, the task, namely, which he has taken upon himself of discussing what he calls universal religion on the basis of the Bible, the Talmud and the history of the Jewish people. Overcoming, however, his reluctance to divulge his ideas in writing because he feels (...) intuitively that he can transcend all his human frailty, he sets about presenting us with a philosophy of entire existence, as he himself puts it. A formidable task indeed. He would be grievously hurt, he tells us, were we to label his effort as theology. And still we are within our rights to ask: what else but theology could or should be the rational penetration of what God has spoken to men? In fact, the finished product turns out to be neither philosophy nor theology, but rather a series of pious, at times even pseudo-mystical reflections on God’s revelation as found in the Old Testament and as interpreted down the centuries in the various Jewish traditions. The serious philosopher or earnest theologian or the historian of religions will find nothing here. (shrink)

Under the careful editorship of R. A. Markus, this book appears to be one of the very finest anthologies of critical essays dedicated to the elucidation of the thought of St. Augustine. Those familiar with Markus’ contribution to The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy will readily attest to the depth as well as to the breadth of understanding which Markus brings to Augustine scholarship. Three of the essays appear for the first time: "Action and Contemplation," by (...) Robert J. O’Connell; "Si Fallor, Sum," by Gareth B. Matthews; "On Augustine’s Concept of a Person," by A. C. Boyd. The remaining articles have appeared either as separate pieces or as journal articles: "St. Augustine and Christian Platonism," by A. H. Armstrong; "St. Augustine on Signs," by R. A. Markus; "The Theory of Signs of St. Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana," by B. Darrell Jackson; "Augustine on Speaking from Memory" and "The Inner Man," by Gareth B. Matthews; "Augustine on Foreknowledge and Free Will," by William L. Rowe; "Augustine on Free Will and Predestination," by John M. Rist; "Time and Contingency in St. Augustine," by Robert Jordan; "Empiricism and Augustine’s Problems about Time," by Hugh M. Lacey; "Political Society," by P. R. L. Brown; "The Development of Augustine’s Ideas on Society before the Donatist Controversy" and "De Civitate Dei, XV, 2, and Augustine’s Idea of the Christian Society," The essays display scholarly depth as well as concern for contemporary philosophical problems. It is an excellent addition to Augustine scholarship and to contemporary philosophizing. This book is part of the Doubleday Anchor Modern Studies in Philosophy Series, under the general editorship of Amelie O. Rorty.—D. A. C. (shrink)

I have little to say on this passage, where it seems necessary to maintain the vulgate notwith standing its obvious defects. My only reason for discussing it is to call attention to the strangeness of Jebb's proceeding when seeking to support Hermann's conjecture παλλλοιν which he admits into the text. The objection to Hermann's view is that, as he himself admits, there is no evidence that πáλληλος could be used in the sense of λληλιφóνος. For that, I suppose, is the (...) meaning of ‘mutual hands,’ which both Jebb and Campbell suggest as a translation, although ‘mutual violence’ would be better. But the chief purpose of this note is to protest against the mode of interpretation applied to Philo de Mose 3. 36. II. p. 175 M. διà τàς ν δασι καí πνρì γνιμéνας συνχς καì παλλλονς φθορáς Turnebu s rightl yrenders ‘alternas interneciones,’ and why Jebb supposes him to have meant ‘mutual’ I do not know. Anyhow he admits that Philo used the word in its ordinary sense of successive, and proceeds to paraphrase ‘owing to the continuous and rapid succession of calamities by flood and fire’ . All this is quite beside the mark, for the reference is to the alternate destruction of the world at the κπρωσις by fire and at the ξγρωσιςby water. I must take leave to refer to the evidence collected in my book on Zeno and Cleanthes, p. 253, to which should be added a most instructive passage of Origen : περì τν κακν λóγος ο μνóντων ì ν τατᾦ διà τν τοι τηροσαν τà πì γ$$$ς πρóνοιαν κατακλνσμο καì κπνρ03CE;σσι καθαíρονσαν.Add the passages from Lucan quoted by Mr. Heitland in his Introduction, p. xliii. (shrink)

Benedikt Stattler was born on January 30, 1728 in Kötzting in Bavaria. In 1745 he entered the Society of Jesus, to which he remained loyal in spirit and in deed until his death, in spite of its suppression in 1773 by Clement XIV From 1760 until 1781 he taught philosophy and theology in Staubing, Solothurn, Innsbruck and Ingolstadt, where the famous J. M. Sailer, Bishop of Regensburg, was his pupil. He died in Munich in 1797. Stattler, then, lived and worked (...) at the very height of the so-called Aufklarungszeit, a fact which had the deepest repercussions on his whole career. He was a zealous man and truly apostolic. Perhaps, if anything he was over-zealous and was in fact carried much too far in his spirit of accommodation and flexibility when faced with the rationalist enemies of the Church and Christianity. He was filled with the idea that they should be met on their own ground in order to win them for the Church. And in order to do that he decided that he must break with tradition. Modern modes of thinking must be used if there is to be even the possibility of discussion with present-day thinkers, was his principle. Accordingly he brushed aside Aristotle, St. Thomas and all the Scholastics and made his own the philosophy of Christian Wolff. For him that was the only way of preserving the Christian and Catholic faith and of safeguarding Christian morality, the Christian way of life. Filled with that idea he wrote indefatigably. Many of his works, however, very early fell foul of the Roman authorities and were put on the Index of forbidden books. And in fact, as Dr. Scholz rightly points out over and over again, Stattler became a victim of the Aufklärung which he sought to Christianize and he himself became a rationalist and, in morals, and out-and-out subjectivist. (shrink)

Evripides Rhes. 161 sqq. Dolon, having undertaken to visit the Greek lines as a spy, addresses Hector:οủκûν πονεεîν μèν χρή, πο;νοûνταμιαθòν φéρεαθαι. παντì γàρ προακε;íμενονκéρρς πρòς.

It would surely have been better to entitle this work ‘Reflexions on ethical theories’, for it cannot in any true sense of the word be called a study, a scientific study which entails detailed analysis and positive criticism. In fact Professor Mackinnon presents us with a series of considerations, highly personal and at times indeed penetrating and instructive, on the moral theories of certain British and continental philosophers—of the 19th century utilitarians ; of Kant, Hegel and their followers; of the (...) theologianphilosopher bishop of Durham, Joseph Butler; of Russell, Moore and others. The impression left on one after a careful perusal of the work is that it is no more than an agglomeration of ‘mights’ and ‘perhaps’, never a clear–cut judgment. The chief general defect of the book and the cause of much obscurity is certainly this: the absence of any welldefined distinction between exposé and critique. As often as not one does not know what the opinion of the author is as distinct from his interpretation of the authors he is studying. This defect would seem to be characteristic of a great part of the ethical writing produced by the Scottish and British schools, when they do not reduce ethical theory to anything better than semasiology, to a study of ethical language or linguistic usage. Prof. Mackinnon has certainly not freed himself from the ‘present confused state of moral philosophy in this country’, which he so rightly condemns. I had thought that all philosophers, of whatever ilk, were agreed that ethical science or moral philosophy was nothing more than the study of the human being on its way towards completeness in human being, from an initial embryonic stage, as it were, to the full flowering of human perfection, manifested in perfect human being and perfect human life—a journey or precess directed and controlled by the human subject itself, fully conscious of the end to be achieved and conscious too of the steps or means towards it. I would have thought too that if we are to set up moral science as distinct from mere semasiology, or from psychology, biology, zoology or botany, then all were agreed that we have to do with the domain of free activity, of voluntary conscious activity, which obviously brings with it the order of responsibility and willed subjection to a given objective order of things, that is, of human nature itself and human perfection. I would have taken for granted too that one could study all this field of the free development of the human being towards its ultimate perfection either with a view to the acquisition of knowledge and nothing more, or precisely with a view to being in a position to direct oneself and others towards that fullness of being. That would give us two distinct modes of moral or ethical theory, the speculative or theoretical and the practical and normative, the resolutive and the compositive. I am not so sure that Professor Mackinnon is ready to admit these presupposita. He speaks of the ‘curious and almost silly claim that we are free’, and at the same time he can write about the ‘frankly metaphysical reality of freedom’, or its ‘near–metaphysical reality’. This, in the language of the author, is just another way of proclaiming that human freedom is no more than a myth, lacking all substance and reality. Moral science as distinct from all other sciences, one would think, presupposes that the moral subject be conscious of itself and its activity, that is, that it fully and clearly know that its life and its activity is its own. It must be master of its own actions, and in that sense truly master of its own destiny. Then and only then are we in the order of moral activity. However, we are warned by Professor Mackinnon that “to know that an action is mine is a very strange sort of knowledge, quite different from knowing that an apple or a book is mine: to use the word ‘know’ in such a context is a venture fraught with intellectual peril”. I sincerely think it would have been better had the author denied straight out the possibility, not just of metaphysics, but of ethical theory tout court; for he denies often enough the existence of the moral subject, namely, man freely and deliberately ordaining himself towards human consummation. Had he done that at the outset he would have been spared the trouble of writing his book. All in all, one gets the distinct impression that the author is just not sure of his ground and has no really sound criterion whereby to judge of various ethical theories. In fact the book ends with a big question–mark: ‘If we speak and write thus, do we speak and write sound and fury signifying nothing?’. Reluctantly I am constrained to answer in the affirmative. And I should like to add, so as not to appear completely destructive, but in some way constructive: if, instead of dismissing Aristotle and his followers, ancient and modern, as mere ‘intuitionists’, Professor Mackinnon would only study them seriously he would first of all find out how unjustified is his condemnation of them and then, I venture to suggest, he would acquire a light to guide him surely through the maze of ethical theory with which he grapples aimlessly and would thus be enabled to extricate himself from ‘the present confused state of moral philosophy’ in Britain. (shrink)

Since 1983, legislators and advocates have introduced Land Access Policy Incentives in twenty of the fifty United States. These bills share a demographic goal: to fund land rental or purchase for young and beginning farmers and ranchers. States’ efforts to facilitate land access are part of a global movement to support farmers’ entry into agriculture and to resist farmers’ increasing exclusion from land. We examine the policy creation processes of nine states to describe how coalitions and government leaders are translating (...) their values around land access barriers into policy tools whose political appeal is broad. The bills often pass unanimously, and enrollments are strong: about 2,000 young and beginning US farmers and ranchers will purchase or rent farms this year through a few states’ land access policy programs. We trace the themes from interviews with 66 of the bills’ authors and advocates, and their documentation and media coverage, to demonstrate the values that bipartisan coalitions enlist to construct successful bills and the compromises that make them politically feasible. The coalitions’ values turn on the threats of rising land costs, farm expansion or consolidation, and land conversion out of agriculture. As a group, the policies serve broadacre farming operations while leaving specialty crop farms largely unserved. Two states have endeavored to include all farmers of color among their policies’ beneficiaries. Our findings demonstrate tradeoffs of states’ current Land Access Policy Incentives and suggest next steps for research and advocacy to inform policy development to support next generation farming opportunities. (shrink)

Aristotle, in chapter 22 of the Poetics , has some remarks on poetic diction. He lays it down that, while poetry should be clear in meaning, it should avoid meanness of expression, σεμν δ κα ξαλλττουσα τò διωτικòν τος ξενικος κεχρημνη—it becomes dignified and elevated above the commonplace when it employs unusual words; ξενικòν δ λγω γλτταν κα μεταφορν κα πκτασιν κα πν τò παρ τò κριον—and examples of unusual words are rare words, metaphors, lengthened forms, and everything that differs (...) from normal speech. He then gives specimens of poetry, to show how the poetic effect can be spoilt by the substitution of τ κρια for τ ξενικ, and of these the two that follow are taken from the Odyssey. The first is Od. 9. 515. (shrink)

The focus on animal welfare in society has increased during the last 50 years. Animal welfare legislation and private standards have developed, and today many farmers within animal production have both governmental legislation and private standards to comply with. In this paper intentions and values are described that were expressed in 14 animal welfare legislation and standards in four European countries; Sweden, United Kingdom, Germany and Spain. It is also discussed if the legislation and standards actually accomplish what they, in (...) their overall description and ethics, claimed to do, i.e. if this is followed up by relevant paragraphs in the actual body of the text in the legislation and standards respectively. The method used was an on-line questionnaire from the EconWelfare research project and text analyses. This study shows that the ethical values within a set of legislation or private standards are not always consistently implemented, and it is not always possible to follow a thread between the intentions mentioned initially and the actual details of the legislation or standard. Since values will differ so will also the animal welfare levels and the implications of similar concepts in the regulations. In general, the regulations described were not based on animal welfare considerations only, but also other aspects, such as food safety, meat quality, environmental aspects and socio-economic aspects were taken into account. This is understandable, but creates a gap between explicit and implicit values, which we argue, can be overcome if such considerations are made more transparent to the citizens/consumers. (shrink)

La 4e de couv. indique : "Le présent ouvrage, rassemblement de textes écrits entre 1942 et 1951, retrace le parcours de l'auteur du point de vue de la phénoménologie à celui du matérialisme dialectique.".

We study the intersection number of families of tall ideals. We show that the intersection number of the class of analytic P-ideals is equal to the bounding number ${\mathfrak{b}}$ , the intersection number of the class of all meager ideals is equal to ${\mathfrak{h}}$ and the intersection number of the class of all F σ ideals is between ${\mathfrak{h}}$ and ${\mathfrak{b}}$ , consistently different from both.

Works of Tran Duc Thao, a Vietnamese philosopher.